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Abstract. The National Bank of Egypt (NBE) was introduced in 1898. It acted as both a 
central and commercial bank for Egypt, and for Sudan for some time. The burgeoning 
Egyptian economy was thought to eventually necessitate a central bank, so in 1961, some of 
the assets of the NBE were taken to form the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE). Ever since, the 
CBE has been Egypt’s monetary authority. Its activity has come under scrutiny over the 
years due to its inability to cope with economic challenges, most notably inflation. This 
paper examines the prospects for introducing a currency board in Egypt. It compares this 
possibility to the existing monetary infrastructure in place and determines whether a 
currency board is a suitable path to take. 
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1. Introduction 
he central banking system in Egypt is old for an emerging market 
country, having existed for almost 120 years. Its long-term record 
raises the question of whether some other monetary arrangement 
may be more suitable for Egypt. This paper is split into several sections, 
primarily according to inflection points in the Egyptian economy. The first 
section begins in 1898, when the National Bank of Egypt (NBE) was 
introduced, and explores several important features of the period that 
lasted until 1960. The next section coversthe introduction of the Central 
Bank of Egypt (CBE) in 1961, and continues until the Arab Spring, which 
took place in Egypt in 2011. The third section explores the Egyptian 
economy since the Arab Spring. The final section discusses the concept of a 
currency board as an alternative to a central bank and the feasibility of 
introducing one in Egypt. 
The table below offers a summary of key economic and political events 
that will be useful for readers to keep in mind. 
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2. Chronology of key political and economic events in 
Egypt since 1898 
1898: National Bank of Egypt founded 
1914-18: World War I; Egypt suspends gold standard and remains tied 
to pound sterling; UK asserts a protectorate over Egypt to supplant 
Ottoman influence 
1919: Revolution in protest of British suzerainty 
1922: British protectorate ends but British influence remains strong 
1939-45: World War II; Egypt invaded by Axis powers,but British and 
Egyptian forces repulse the attacks 
1947: Egypt leaves the sterling area 
1948-49: First Arab-Israeli War 
1952: Coup ends Egypt’s monarchy and begins rule by a series of 
dictators 
1955: Sudan unilaterally declares independence from UK and Egypt 
1956: Nationalization of Suez Canal; Suez War 
1958-61:United Arab Republic, an abortive attempt at union with Syria 
1960: Banks nationalized 
1961:Central Bank of Egypt created 
1962: First-ever devaluation of Egyptian pound relative to the pound 
sterling 
1967:Six-Day War against Israel 
1973:Yom Kippur War against Israel 
1981:Substantial devaluation of Egyptian pound begins an era, 
continuing to the present, in which the pound always depreciates against 
major currencies over a long enough horizon 
2011: Arab Spring protests lead to downfall of dictator Hosni Mubarak 
2011-12: First democratic elections in Egyptian history bring Muslim 
Brotherhood to power 
2013: Coup deposes Muslim Brotherhood 
2016:IMF deal reached; Egyptian pound floated, depreciates 
substantially 
2017: Second tranche of IMF loan worth $1 billion approved 
 
3. The National Bank of Egypt as Central Bank, 1898–
1961 
The National Bank of Egypt (NBE) was established on June 25, 1898 by a 
Khedival decree. (The Khedive was a Turkish term meaning “viceroy.” 
Before World War I, Egypt was nominally part of the Ottoman Empire and 
the Egyptian ruler was nominally subordinate to the Ottoman sultan. In 
practice Egypt was independent, though under considerable British 
influence.) The statutes of the bank provided it with some objectives,listed 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Summary of several objectives of the National Bank of Egypt upon inception in 
1898 (Statute of NBE, 1898: 3–10) 
Article Number Objective 
4 
Issue advances to agricultural persons 
Issue of loans and advances to the government of Egypt and Sudan 
Receive deposits from the public 
Perform all commercial and financial operations in Egypt and Sudan 
8 Publish, every month, its financial situation, in the Official Journal 
 
The NBE had an interesting management structure due to the influence 
of foreign powers. It was initially set up and funded by three individuals: 
Sir Ernest Cassel (British, of German origin), Raphael Suares (an Egyptian 
Jew), and Constantine Salvago (Italian). Cassel bought 50 percent of the 
shares in the company, whileSuares and Salvago each purchased 25 
percent. The NBE did not have an Egyptian chief executive until 1940, 
when Ali Chamsi Pasha took office (Raafat, 1998). Until then, a British 
subject ran the NBE. This exemplifies the level of control the British wanted 
to have over Egypt, which was strategically valuable given itsregional 
importance in the Middle East and its position as a chokepoint for transit to 
Britain’s Indian Ocean colonies via the Suez Canal.  
The Khedival decreespecifiedseveral aspects of how the bank was to be 
operated. For instance, Article 20 requiredan administrative council headed 
by a governor composed of at least 12 members and at most 28 members. 
Four members were part of a special committee in London. The rest of the 
members had seats in Cairo. In addition, Article 21 affirmedthat the 
governor and the sub-governors were responsible for their acts before the 
administrative council. Their nomination and appointment had to be 
ratified by the Egyptian government before they took office. The governor 
could be hold office for five years. Members other than the governors but 
including members in London were required to have had at least five years 
of residence in Egypt. 
Imitating both the Bank of England and a number of other central banks 
at the time, the NBE was separated into an Issue Department and a 
Banking Department. The former department primarily issued notes and 
coins, whereas the latter conducted day-to-day banking activities.  
A later statute, Section 2 of Law No. 163 of 1957, illustrates the 
relationship of the NationalBank of Egypt with the government. In addition 
to statingthat the NBE would not charge the government for any of its 
services, Article 14 affirmed that the “Bank shall act on behalf of the 
Government in administering, floating, serving, and amortizing debt.” 
Article 15 specified the details of this relationship by asserting that the 
“Bank may advance loans to the Government to cover seasonal deficits in 
the State Budget within 10 percent of the average public revenue during the 
three preceding years” (Law No. 163, 1957). Moreover, the government was 
expected to settle these loans within 12 months of their issuance. It is also 
worthwhile to mention that operating banks at that time were required to 
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have at least 500,000 Egyptian pounds (EGP) in the form of shares owned 
by Egyptians (El-Din & Algarhi, 2005).   
The NBE also had a reserve requirement for its note issue, as 
exemplified by Article 18 of Law No 163 of 1957,which stated: 
Banknotes in circulation shall always have an equivalent cover 
consisting of gold, foreign bonds, Egyptian Government Bonds and 
bills, Egyptian bonds guaranteed by the Egyptian Government and 
discountable commercial papers. 
Khalid Ikram, a former longtime World Bank resident representative in 
Egypt, mentions that the National Bank of Egypt essentially functioned like 
a central bank, for it “had a monopoly of the note issue, it was the lender of 
last resort, and it had control of the bank rate” (Ikram, 2007, p.6). 
Like most other central banks, the National Bank of Egypt was 
conceived only after the country already had a substantial commercial 
banking system. The first durable moderncommercial bank, the London-
based Bank of Egypt, had been established in 1856.  Prior to 1898, though, 
there was no local issue of currency notes. The public used domestic and 
foreign coins. Gold coins predominated in larger transactions, with the 
British sovereign having particularly wide acceptance (Rifaat 1935: 47ff). 
Although not immediately popular, notes soon gained traction, and their 
supply gradually increased over the years.  
The issuance of notes was relatively slow immediately after the 
inception of the NBE in 1898. This was the case until 1914, the beginning of 
World War I, when the annual growth rate of notes issued hit 205 percent. 
Soon after WWI, noteissuance decreased, but circulationremained 
higherthan its prewar level. Theoutbreak of World War II in 1939 
againboosted note issuance. These observations make intuitive sense, as 
Egypt fundedits wartimespendingpartly through the increased supply of 
notes. In addition to the aforementioned, Egypt, acting as a base for British 
military operations during both wars, received an inflow of funds from the 
United Kingdom to pay for local supplies that British military personnel 
used.  
 
 
Figure 1. Notes Issued by the National Bank of Egypt, 1899-1945 
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A Khedival decree of November 14, 1885 had enacted a gold standard in 
Egypt, which set the Egyptian pound as equal to 7.4375 grams of gold. That 
made EGP 0.975 equal to £1 sterling. On August 2, 1914, just after World 
War I began, Egypt enacted a decree to suspend the gold standard. The 
exchange rate with sterling, which had also suspended the gold standard, 
remained unchanged. Egypt was henceforth effectively on a sterling 
exchange standard, and the exchange rate with sterling would remain 
unchanged until Egypt devalued the Egyptian pound in 1962. Egypt 
however left the “sterling area,” the common set of exchange controls for 
most countries pegged to sterling, in 1947, and the U.S. dollar became 
increasingly important in Egypt’s trade, finance, and monetary policyafter 
World War II. The Egyptian pound had exchange controls that, especially 
after Egypt left the sterling area, made it difficult to obtain foreign currency 
at the official exchange rate. A black-market parallel exchange rate existed 
where the Egyptian pound was weaker than the official rate. A parallel rate 
(not an informal market rate) was a persistent feature of Egyptian foreign 
exchange from 1914 until the pound was floated in 2016, although the gap 
between the official rate and the parallel rate varied widely over time.     
Figure 2 shows the assets and the liabilities of the National Bank of 
Egypt during the period it had central banking responsibilities. Figures 3 
and 4 show breakdowns of major assets and liabilities. The underlying data 
have been digitized for the first time in an accompanying Excel workbook. 
Figure 5 shows real GDP per person. The average growth of real GDP 
(total, not per person) from 1898 to 1945 was 2.66 percent, while the 
average growth of nominal GDP was 5.79 percent, implying a GDP deflator 
of 3.05 percent a year.  
 
 
Figure 2. Total assets and liabilities of the Central Bank of Egypt from 1902 to 1957 
(National Bank of Egypt, 1902-1957). Note that assets equal the liabilities. 
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Figure 3. Major components of the assets of the NBE over time expressed as a percentage of 
the total assets (National Bank of Egypt, 1900-1960). 
 
 
Figure 4. Major components of the liabilities of the NBE over time expressed as a 
percentage of the total assets (National Bank of Egypt, 1902-1957).  
 
 
Figure 5. Egypt’s real GDP per capita spanning the 48 years between 1898 and 1945 
(Yousef, 2002). 
 
The NBE asset breakdown shows the high degree of interaction between 
the NBE and the government. As Figure 3 illustrates, the proportion of 
assets the NBE held that were government securities burgeoned, reaching a 
peak of 75 percent in 1947. We will touch on the implications of this asset 
composition later with regard to the political independence of the bank. It 
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may be worthwhile to note that in its early years, the NBE was involved in 
Sudan, hence a small proportion of its assets are attributed to the 
government of Sudan.  
 
4. The Central Bank of Egypt, 1961–2011 
Soon after Gamal Abdel Nasser took office in 1956, a wave of 
nationalizations took place in Egypt. It seemed that these nationalizations 
were preliminaries to what was known as the first five-year plan – a plan 
intended to span 1960 to 1965, in which the public sector was to fill in 
deficiencies found in the private sector (Waterbury, 2014).    
In mid-1960, the government nationalized the NBE and other domestic 
banks, which included BankMisr and BanqueBelge et Internationale. The 
government then separated some of the NBE’s assets and liabilities with the 
objective of establishing the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) (Economy of the 
United Arab Republic,n.d., p. 20). These assets and liabilities were taken 
from both the Note Issue Department and the Banking Department of the 
NBE, and included bankers’ deposits, gold, and foreign reserves, among 
other categories (Sanchiz, 1965). Many felt that it was the righttime to 
introduce a “pure” central bank, which would not engage in retail deposit 
taking and lending, into the Egyptian economy. 
Looking at the annual reports of the NBE at the time of the spinoff of 
part of the NBE into the CBE, there appears to be a huge spike in the total 
assets and liabilities of the CBE, from approximately EGP 76million at the 
beginning of 1961 to EGP 125 million by the end of the year (National Bank 
of Egypt, 1973). The exact direction of this causation, or whether it even 
exists, is difficult to pinpoint. In other words, did the spinoff of part of the 
NBE into the CBE result in this change, or did the increase in total assets 
and liabilities provoke the establishment of CBE? Interestingly, the primary 
liability that contributed to the rise was deposits, which almost doubled in 
1961. On the assetside, bills discounted increased by a factor of ten.  
To compare the CBE and NBE, let us analyze their respective statutes. 
Articles 38 and 39 in Presidential Decree No. 64 (establishing the CBE) 
state: 
Article (38) - The government may assign the Bank to act on its own 
behalf, in issuing government bonds and bills. The Bank shall extend 
consultation to the government in respect thereof. The Bank shall not 
incur any obligations nor gain any rights by virtue of this assignment.  
Article (39) - The Bank shall extend financing to the government, upon 
its request, to cover the seasonal deficit on the general budget. The 
Bank, in agreement with the Ministry of Finance, shall determine the 
conditions concerning this finance, according to the prevailing 
monetary and credit situations, provided that the amount of such 
finance shall not exceed 10 percent of the average revenues of the 
general budget in the three previous years. The term of the said 
finance shall be three months renewable for other similar periods. The 
finance shall be settled in full within twelve months at most from the 
date of its extension. (Emphasis added.) 
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Comparing these articles to those of the original statute of the National 
Bank of Egypt, one sees that they are almost identical. In other words, from 
this perspective, the objectives of the CBE as stated in 1961 are the same as 
the objectives of the NBE as stated in 1898. This corroborates the idea that 
the National Bank of Egypt had been acting as a central bank as well as a 
commercial bank.  
Certain objectives of the CBE, however, differed from those of the NBE’s 
1898 charter. In addition to having the responsibility of issuing banknotes, 
the CBE was assigned with carrying out open-market operations. The rest 
of the CBE’s objectives, less important for our analysis here, can be found in 
Article 6 of Presidential Decree No. 64.  
In 1962, soon after the initiation of the CBE, Egypt devalued the pound 
from US$2.80 to $2.30. In 1973, it revalued the pound to $2.55555 when the 
dollar was devalued against gold. All during this time, Egypt had exchange 
controls, a multiple exchange rate system (see parallel exchange rate 
above), and a parallel market in foreign exchange. The pound was in reality 
far weaker than the official rate. In 1979, it was devalued to approximately 
$1.43 (EGP 0.70 = $1). From 1987 onward, the exchange rate was a managed 
float with the U.S. dollar. 
A turning point in Egyptian economic policy occurred with the 
Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) 
implemented in 1991. Prior to ERSAP, the CBE had undertaken monetary 
targeting for quite some time. This monetary targeting was performed with 
the aim of achieving price stability; however, according to Abu-Elayoun 
(2003), the strategy was limited in its success due to the weak relationship 
between broad money supply (M2) and the interest rate.  
The ERSAP was an economic and structural agreement by the Egyptian 
governmentwith several other institutions, including the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and a division of the World Bank known as the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). AsEgypt 
wasexperiencing high inflation toward the end of the 1980s, the ERSAP 
programme was deemed necessaryto re-stabilize the economy, and 
ultimately reduce inflation. An analysis by the African Development Bank 
(AfDB) lists the following as the primary goals of the ERSAP (African 
Development Bank Group, 2000): 
1. Economic stabilization and inflation reduction. 
2. “Structural adjustment to stimulate medium and long-term growth.” 
3. Liberalization of interest rates. 
Thethird point meant that the central bank was no longer able to target 
inflation via administrative controls of interest rates, as it had long done. 
Consequently, another method had to be chosen. Note that monetary 
policy canhave three different levels: the final target, the operational target 
controlled by the monetary authority, and the intermediate target linking 
them. According to some sources, the CBE after 1996 had a pair of 
contradictory goals in mind. It desired to achieve both price stability and 
exchange rate stability. This was problematic, since the maintenance of a 
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pegged exchange rate requiredmanipulation of the money supply, which in 
turn would affect the price level. In his historical summary of Egyptian 
monetary policy, Sherif Hassan (2016) writes:  
Third, authorities should refrain from targeting the level or path of 
any other nominal variable, such as wages or the nominal exchange 
rate. A country that chooses a fixed exchange rate system 
subordinates its monetary policy to the exchange rate objective and is 
not effectively able to target directly any other nominal variable, such 
as the rate of inflation. 
From 1996 onwards, the CBE conducted monetary policy through 
monetary targeting. The operational target was the overnight interbank 
rate. The intermediate target was M2, chosen because it was believed to 
have the strongest relationship with inflation, the final target, though there 
was no explicit numerical target (M2) range. By adjusting the overnight 
rate, the CBE moved closer toward inflation targeting as practiced by other 
central banks. The broad money supply, M2, remained the intermediate 
target.  
For inflation targeting to work efficiently, the central bank requires a 
certain level of autonomy. In other words, inflation targeting necessitates 
the independence of the central bank from the government. The central 
bank independence (CBI) index, shown below, was introduced by Jacome 
and Vazquez (Jacome & Vazquez, 2005). The index hypothesizes an inverse 
relationship between inflation and central bank independence. The first 
figure represents the weighting criteria used for each category. The second 
figure applies the criteria to the CBE from its inception in 1961 to 2004. We 
have extendedtheirframework to cover a fifth periodfrom 2005 to 2017.  
The CBE always had a close relationship to the Egyptian government in 
terms of financing its budget deficit. Such a relationship, some argue, 
hindered the CBE’s ability to handle global and local challenges. For 
instance, in 1999, the CBE experienced a significant drop in foreignreserves, 
which was detrimental to the economy as it meant that vital imports could 
no longer be obtained at the official exchange rate. During the recession of 
2001, the CBE responded with an expansionary monetary policy, and 
inflation rose to a high of 9 percent in 2004 (Index Mundi, n.d.). Although 
not high by the standards of many emerging markets, in the Egyptian 
context it was substantial. Consequently, the CBE, as an institution that is 
supposed to control inflation and not create it, lost credibility amongst 
investors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Kiyasseh & D. Gumino, JEB, 6(3), 2019, p.192-227. 
200 
 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
Table 2. Jacome Index for Central Bank Independence: criteria and wieghts 
 
 
 
Table 3. Application of Jacome Index for central bank independence to the National Bank 
of Egypt and the Central Bank of Egypt recently (after Kamaly & Farrag, 2007) 
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Table 4. Our extension of the Jacome Index for central bank independence to the NBE from 
1898 to 1961, and to the CBE from 2005 to 2017. 
 
NBE 
1898-1961 
CBE Fifth Period 
2005-2017 
Criteria Value Weight Weight-ed Value Val-ue Weight Weight-ed Value 
1. Central Bank Objective 0 2 0 0.5 2 1 
2. Appointment and terms of office of the members 
of CBE 
0 2 0 0 2 0 
3. Structure of central bank board 0 2 0 0.5 2 1 
4. Removal of Board Members 0.5 2 1 0.5 2 1 
5. CBE credit to government 0.5 3 1.5 0 3 0 
6. Lender of last resort 0.5 2 1 0.5 2 1 
7. Independence in monetary policy 0.5 3 1.5 0.5 3 1.5 
8. Financial independence 1 1 1 1 1 1 
9. Accountability 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10. Transparency and disclosure of financial 
statement 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
(See appendix for explanation of values)  19 NBE Σ = 7  19 CBE Σ = 8.5 
 
In response toinflation-related problems, an amendment was introduced 
to the CBE charter in 2003, stating that the main objective of the CBE was to 
perform inflation targeting (Youssef, 2007). One of the main potential 
inconsistenciesin the resultingpolicy mixwas that it is quite difficult to 
simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate and control inflation. In 
order to maintain the peg of the Egyptian pound with the U.S. dollar, the 
money supply would have to be altered accordingly. The change in money 
supply, however, would surely affect the price level. Consequently, the 
CBE announced at the end of 2003 that it would move to a floating 
exchange rate. This move resulted in a 50 percent depreciation of the 
Egyptian pound and a subsequent rise in prices. This situation, as will be 
shown later, wassimilar to what happened in November 2016. In mid-2014, 
however, the exchange rate was pegged once again to the U.S. dollar. At 
the end of June 2005, the official pegged rate was EGP 5.80 per dollar 
(Central Bank of Egypt, 2005, p.24). 
To evaluate the performance of the CBE during this period, Figure 6 
presents the trend of real GDP per person per capita. Figure 7 presents the 
total assets and liabilities of the CBE during its lifetime. 
Figure 6 shows that real GDP per capita had an average annual growth 
rate of 2.60 percent from 1961 to 2016. Growth in nominal GDPaveraged 
4.85 percent per annum. (See the next page.) 
To delve deeper into the balance sheets of the NBE and CBE, Figures 8 
and 9 show the major components of their assets and liabilities, expressed 
as a percentage of the total. (See two pages below.) 
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Figure 6. Egypt’s real GDP per capita from 1961-2010 (IMF International Financial 
Statistics, 2015) 
 
 
Figure 7. Total assets and liabilities of the Central Bank of Egypt from 1961-2008 (IMF 
International Financial Statistics, 2015) 
 
 
Figure 8. Major components of assets of the NBE, and then CBE, as a percentage of total 
assets (International Monetary Fund, 2008). Data for 2009 onward are in Figure D3 in 
Appendix D. 
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Figure 9. Major components of liabilities of the NBE, and then CBE, as a percentage of 
total liabilities (International Monetary Fund, 2008). Data for 2009 onward are in Figure 
D3 in Appendix D. 
 
There are two particularly interesting features of Figure 8. The first 
involves the proportion of assets that are net foreign assets (the light blue 
bars at the base).This value dropped from a high of 78 percent in 1953 to a 
low of 8 percent in 1989. This finding is significant and will be relevant 
when discussing currency boards later in the paper, since orthodox 
currency boards usually have 100 percent of net foreign assets to total 
assets. A small ratio of foreign assets implies that it may be difficult for the 
CBE to transition to a currency board.  The second interesting feature is the 
proportion of total assets comprising claims on the central government (the 
orange bars). Loans to central government institutions were as low as 17 
percent of total central bank assets in 1954; however, they steadily 
increased and reached a high of 78 percent in 1989. That is a significant rise, 
which is consistent with the increase in government debt in that period (see 
Figure 12 a few pages below). Increased debt requires funding, and some of 
it came from the CBE. Whether or not the rapid growth in net claims to 
central government in the 1970s can be attributed to any one factor is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worth mentioning that 
Anwar Sadat took power in 1970, and the government began to advocate 
the concept of infitah(openness regarding private investment with Israel; 
more on this in section III). In more recent years, the net claims on the 
government and public economic authorities have continued to grow, 
rising by 30.2 percent in 2014 and 23.6 percent in 2015. By the end of June 
2015, net credit to the government was 65.3 percent of total banking system 
credit (CBE Annual Report, 2015: 12).  
The greater the proportion of CBE credit to the government, the less 
market oriented the Egyptian economy probably becomes because the less 
likely it is that that government is paying a market rate of interest on its 
debt. Continuous credit given by the CBE to the government makes it 
difficult for the latter to ascertain the true status of the market.  
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5. The Arab Spring and after, 2011-present 
The so-called Arab Spring began in Tunisia in December 2010 as a 
protest against the corruption and cronyism that were prevalent during the 
long rule of dictator Zine El Abadine Ben Ali. The protestors found that 
they had widespread support and they were successful in forcing Ben Ali 
to flee the country, ending his rule. The Tunisian revolution inspired 
similar events in many other Arab dictatorships. In Egypt, mass protests 
erupted on January 25, 2011 and on February 11 the vice president 
announced that President Hosni Mubarak had resigned. Egypt held its first 
truly democratic parliamentary electionsfrom November 2011 to January 
2012 and its first truly democraticpresidential electionin May and June 
2012. The Muslim Brotherhood, the most well organized political group, 
dominated the parliamentary elections, and wonthe presidency. However, 
President Mohamed Morsi and the parliament undertook measures that 
created distrust among many Egyptians, in particularthe hasty drafting of a 
new constitution, whose approval by referendum did not allay the 
concerns of large and influential groups within Egyptian society. On June 
30, 2013, protests against Morsi erupted. On July 3, a military coup ousted 
him. The Egyptian military issued a decree in November 2013 that in effect 
granted itself unlimited powers. Egypt has since remained under military 
rule. The current president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who assumed office in 
2014, was the minister of defense and commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces under Morsi. 
Upon election, Sisi faced the same problems as his predecessors: 
economic growth lagging well behind the leading emerging markets; large 
government budget deficits, financed in part by central bank credit and 
leading to persistent inflation; insufficient creation of jobs in the formal 
sector to absorb large numbers of young job-seekers; inefficient yet 
politically popular subsidies draining government resources; large, 
unproductive state enterprises; and pervasive corruption. The latest of 
many economic reform programs is attempting to tackle some of these 
issues. It is described in more detail below. First, let us take stock of key 
economic and financial indicators over the whole period since 1898, to the 
extent that data are available. 
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Figure 10. Egyptian pounds per US dollar, 1898-2018 (Measuring Worth, 2018; 
scale on horizontal axis varies). 
Figure 10 illustrates the trajectory of the exchange rate between the 
Egyptian pound and the US dollar since 1898, the same year the NBE was 
initiated. As the reader can see, there have been frequent depreciations of 
the Egyptian pound since then, with a sharp appreciation in the first 
quarter of 1974. This could be attributed primarily to the infitah that 
Egyptian economic policy was promoting at the time. The government was 
encouraging foreign and Arab investment in the economy, and such 
activities increased demand for the Egyptian pound. The relative stability 
of the Egyptian pound at the end of the 20th century is due to the managed 
float that the CBE introduced. Subsequent sections discuss the next period 
in Egypt’s financial history. 
 
 
Figure 11. Inflation in Egypt as expressed by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), starting in 
1898 (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010; Central Bank of Egypt, 2017). 
 
Figure 11 shows that inflation in Egypt has followed the same trend as 
many other economies: inflationhas become more stable over time. In the 
early 20th century, inflation jumped sporadically from large positive values 
to large negative values within relatively short periods. For instance, 1918 
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saw an annual inflation rate of approximately 38 percent, whereas in 1920 
the economy experienced 40 percent deflation. Such large swings and 
deflations are rarely seen nowadays, due to interventions by central banks 
that aim to stabilize inflation.  
 
 
Figure 12. Government debt as a percentage of GDP from 1898to 2008. Note that data are 
missing for the years 1944 to 1969 (Reinhart &Rogoff, 2010). 
 
Government debt is whenthe sum of government surpluses and deficits 
over time, plus interest, is negative. There is an observable decrease in 
government debt as a percentage of GDP from 1898 to 1943, when a data 
gap begins. This decrease could have several possible explanations. It could 
be that the government was generating surpluses in that period. Another 
possibility is that the economy was experiencing a deficit, but GDP was 
growing faster than government debt. These different explanations have 
implications in terms of whether the NBE and later the CBE stepped in to 
fund the deficit and acted differently than a purely profit-oriented 
commercial bank would have. Although it is not apparent in Figure 12, 
there has been an uptick in the government debt to GDP ratio in the past 
few years. Fakhry El-Fiky, a professor of economics at Cairo University,has 
implicitly confirmed the lack of independence of financial institutions in 
Egypt, stating “the government only takes loans from banks to make up for 
the budget deficit” (Shuwekhi, 2015). Observers believe that since the banks 
give out loans to the government, there exists a lack of loans to the private 
sector, which potentially contributes to economic sluggishness in Egypt.  
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5.1. Total unemployment 
 
Figure 13. Total unemployment rate in Egypt since 2008 (Egypt Unemployment Rate, 
2017) 
 
Figure 13 clearly shows the immediate detrimental impact of the Arab 
Spring uprisings on Egypt’s economic situation. The uprisingsresulted in a 
spike of the total unemployment rate from around 9 percent to 12 percent 
within the first year, 2011. The rate reached a high of 13.4 percent, and 
currently rests at 11.3 percent. On a more positive note, however, anIMF 
report released in October 2016 forecasts total unemployment to fall to 8.4 
percent by the end of 2020. Whether these estimates took into consideration 
the $12 billion IMF loan issued in November 2016 is uncertain. That factor 
may provide the economy with a greater push. 
Even though total unemployment has been worrisome, a more alarming 
indicator has been youth unemployment.  In 2013, it reached a high of 13.6 
percent, whereas estimates of the 2017 value are at 12.1%, with a projected 
decrease in subsequent years (International Labor Organization, 2018).  
 
5.2. Recent developments: 2016-2018 
In November 2016, the IMF and the Egyptian government reached 
agreement on an IMF loan worth $12 billion that would span three years. 
The details of the loan can be found on the IMF website. Some of the key 
points ofthe agreement are summarized below (IMF, 2017).  
1. Real GDP growth is forecasted to increase to 6 percent in the 
medium term. 
2. Foreign reserves are expected to reach $33 billion by the end of the 
2018/2019 fiscal year. 
3. The Central Bank of Egypt will be involved in “money targeting.” 
4. The CBE will “maintain short-term interest rates at levels that 
ensure tight liquidity conditions.” 
5. The wage bill will be increased, though at below the rate of inflation. 
Throughout its history, Egypt has switched betweenseveral exchange 
rate regimes. The two most common ones have beenmanaged floats and 
pegging to the U.S. dollar. For instance, between August 1, 1981, and August 
14, 1989, the Egyptian pound was pegged at EGP 0.70 = US$1. This was the 
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official rate, even though most transactions occurred at a slightly different 
level due to the introduction of premiums by Egyptian commercial banks.  
On November 3, 2016, the CBE decided to float the Egyptian pound, 
resulting in its immediate depreciation (by 57.8 percent) from a pegged 
value of 8.8 EGP/US$ (with the pegged value only recently set in March of 
the same year). Devaluation was a prerequisite for the IMF loan, and it was 
believed that it would eventually boost Egypt’s external standing. Egypt’s 
exports and tourism industry should be observing a healthy comeback if 
the devaluation works—a much-needed change for tourism, which has 
experienced a steady decline since the uprisings of 2011. An extensive 
study of the Egyptian pound devaluation by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2017) offers some hope on that score.  
 
5.3. Exchange rateand inflation rate  
The Troubled Currencies Project, directedby Professor Steve Hanke at 
the Cato Institute, records black market exchange rates of many currencies. 
As of November 2, 2017, the black-market exchange rate was EGP 17.75per 
U.S. dollar. Thiswas quiteclose to the official rate of 17.70, partly due to the 
recent devaluation of the pound, which was, as mentioned above, a 
prerequisite for the IMF loan.  
 
 
Figure 14. Devaluation of the Egyptian pound in the last three years. The red line is the 
official exchange rate, while the blue line is the black-market rate (Hanke, 2017a). 
 
The black-market rate can be used to calculate an alternative, implied 
inflation rate, as follows: 
 (1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)= (1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)(1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟) 
𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸.
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈$  
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The implied inflation rate as of May 3, 2017 was 105.1 percent, where as 
the official inflation rate on the same date was 30.9 percent. The difference 
is attributable to a number of factors. One is that the consumer price index 
basket includes goods whose prices are fixed by the government and hence 
do not vary according to the exchange rate. Another is that the exchange 
rate pass-through is often less than 1 when prices of foreign goods rise. In 
addition, consumers can often substitute foreign goods with cheaper 
domestic goods when the exchange rate depreciates substantially. Despite 
all those considerations, though, the enormous difference between the 
official and implied inflation rates suggests that the official rate is missing 
something important about what is happening to the economy. As of 
February 2018, the official inflation rate has fallen to 14.4% from its highest 
value of 35.3% in July of 2017.  
 
 
Figure 15. Cycles of inflation (year on year growth, in percent) in Egypt from January 
2003 to January 2013 (Central Bank of Egypt, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 16. Annual inflation rate in Egypt over the past four years. The red line represents 
the official year-over-yearinflation rate, whereas the blue line is the implied annual inflation 
rate. The latter’s derivation is shown above (Hanke, 2017b). 
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5.4. Interest rates – Lending and deposit 
As of March 27, 2017, the commercial bank deposit rate in Egypt was 
14.75 percent, whereas the lending rate was 15.75 percent. These rates had 
risen to these values following the IMF deal reached with the Egyptian 
government in mid-November 2017. Overall, the direction of this trend is 
consistent with the current policy the central bank is undertaking, which is 
one of increased interest rates. The justification for this is to 
curbexpectedincreases in prices (inflation) as a result of the depreciation of 
the Egyptian pound. Currently, as of March 24, 2018, the commercial bank 
deposit rate in Egypt is 7.25 percent, whereas the lending rate is 11.10 
percent. 
 
6. The concept of currency boards 
The foregoing analysis of Egypt’s experience of inflation, exchange 
controls, and currency depreciation under central banking, especially 
under the CBE, raises the question of whether some other monetary 
arrangement might be more suitable for Egypt. One potential alternative 
arrangement would be a currency board. Currency boardswere first 
established in the 19th century and in the early 20th century they existed in 
dozens of countries, especially in the British Empire. An orthodox currency 
board hasa number of characteristics (Hanke & Schuler 2015: 3). The key 
ones are: 
1. A fixed nominal exchange rate with an anchor currency. The anchor 
currency is usually one that is relatively stable and has high credibility 
2. Unrestricted convertibility between the domestic currency and the 
anchor currency. 
3. All note and coin issues and other monetary liabilities of the 
currency board, if any, must be backed 100 percent by foreign reserves. 
4. Depending on its structure, the boardcan be established as having a 
monopoly of note issue, or in parallel to the existing central bank of the 
economy.  
A case study of a currency board success in Bulgaria can be found in 
Appendix C.  
 
7. Establishing a currency board 
In the 1990s, currency boards enjoyed a revival after a generation of 
neglect. Several emerging market countries established currency board-
inspired systems, ranging from fairly close to orthodox currency boards to 
more like typical central banks but with additional constraints on their 
behavior. Currency boards received consideration across emerging markets 
because of the demonstrably poor long-run performance of many emerging 
market central banks in curbing inflation and providing convertible 
currencies. That is the context in which we consider the possibility and 
mechanics of establishing a currency board in Egypt. 
 
D. Kiyasseh & D. Gumino, JEB, 6(3), 2019, p.192-227. 
211 
 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
The table below shows the Jacome and Vazquez central bank 
independence (CBI) index, discussed earlier, applied here theoretically to 
an orthodox currency board. An orthodox currency board would be more 
independent than the NBE was or than the CBE has been. To repeat, 
economic literature hypothesizes an inverse relationship between central 
bank independence and inflation. A currency board would accordingly be 
conducive to low inflation. 
 
Table 6. Extended Jacome CBI index applied to an orthodox currency board 
 Currency Board 
Criteria Value Weight Weighted Value 
1. Central Bank Objective 0 2 0 
2. Appointment and terms of office of the 
members of CBE 
0.5 2 1 
3. Structure of central bank board 0.5 2 1 
4. Removal of Board Members 0.5 2 1 
5. CBE credit to government 1 3 3 
6. Lender of last resort 1 2 2 
7. Independence in monetary policy 1 3 3 
8. Financial independence 0.5 1 0.5 
9. Accountability 0 1 0 
10. Transparency and disclosure of financial 
statement 1 1 1 
(See appendix for explanation of values)   CB Σ = 12.5 
 
The establishment of a currency board in Egyptcould arise in one of two 
ways. The first would beto replacethe central bank with a currency board. 
The second would be to introduce the currency board as an institution that 
issues a currency parallel to the one issued by the Central Bank of Egypt. 
Both of these scenarios will be evaluated in the following section. 
 
7.1. Scenario A –Replacing the Central Bank of Egypt with a 
currency board 
To ensure the proper and efficient establishment of a currency board, 
certain steps must be taken, as Hanke & Schuler (2015: 46-50) have 
described. The requirements are listed below. 
1. Delegate certain activities performed by CBE. 
The finance ministry could take over the task of advising the 
government on monetary affairs.Commercial banks could take over the 
tasks of clearing checks and providing deposit insurance protection 
through a cooperative arrangement. 
2. Prevent the CBE from increasing the money supply to fund budget deficits. 
Governments that are tightly connected to their central banks often have 
the central banks increase the money supply to fund budget deficits. This 
cannot be the case with a currency board. The Egyptian government would 
have to manage fiscal policy to fund such deficits by market means. In 
other words, they would be required toincrease taxation levels, borrow 
from the public, and/or decrease their expenditure.   
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3. Obtain sufficient reserves. 
Currency boards are required to have 100 percentor slightly greater 
foreign reserve backing for their monetary liabilities. These reserves can 
include, but are not limited to, assets denominated in the anchor currency. 
In this manner, seigniorage develops a greater role in the economy. It 
ultimately comes down to the difference between the interest earned on the 
bonds held by the currency board, and the expenses of handling and 
maintaining the issued notes, coins, and deposits.   
4. Fix the Egyptian pound to an anchor currency. 
The Egyptian pound would need to be fixed to a stable anchor currency, 
one that the public has confidence in. The choice of such an anchor 
currency is an important one and is evaluated below. A fixed exchange rate 
creates a predictable environment, one that divests it of speculation, injects 
the economy with confidence, and attractsforeign investment.  
5. Transfer the assets and liabilities of the CBE to the currency board. 
As this point, the CBE would cease to exist, and the currency board 
would enter the economy as a functional institution.  
Since point 3 above calls for sufficient reserves, the CBE’s current foreign 
reserves would have to be analyzed. The deal Egypt reached with the IMF 
bolstered Egypt’s weak foreign reserve position. As of January 31, 2018, the 
CBE said that its foreign reserves stood at approximately $37.020billion 
(Ahram Online, 2017). At the exchange rate of about 17.7 EGP per dollar on 
that date, foreign reserves totaled 655 billion EGP. As of October 2017, the 
latest date currently shown in the CBE’s Monthly Statistical Bulletin, the 
monetary base was 675 billion EGP—not far above reserves, if the 
monetary base has not grown substantially since October. To achieve 100 
percent reserve backing, the earnings of the successor currency board could 
be retained until foreign assets equal the monetary base. Even though the 
sale of domestic assets inherited from the CBE is also a possibility, 
assuming they are liquid, the currency board may be better off holding on 
to them in the meantime.  
 
7.2. Scenario B -Introducinga Currency Board in Parallel to the 
Central Bank of Egypt  
The second way in which the currency board could be introduced is in 
parallel to the CBE. This process might prove to be easier than outright 
replacement due to the fewer steps required and the potentially lower 
political resistance that it may face. Overhauling an important institution 
such as the CBE, which has existed since 1961, may prove difficult. 
Consequently, this idea is proposed as an alternative. In addition to the 
integral components of a currency board, such as the maintenance of at 
least 100 percentforeign reserves and the fixing of the issued currency to an 
anchor currency, the following steps are also required.  
1. Announce the anchor currency and fixed exchange rate. 
As in the replacement scenario, an anchor currency must be chosen 
appropriately, and the exchange rate at which it will be exchanged should 
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be accurately identified. A high exchange rate would decrease Egypt’s 
foreign competitiveness, as their exports would appear expensive to 
foreigners. Conversely, an exchange rate thatis too low would makeforeign 
goods relativelyexpensive, and Egypt may experience “imported inflation.” 
One way to address the issue would simply be to have the new currency 
equal to the anchor currency. Thus, the “Egyptian dollar” might be equal to 
the U.S. dollar and fluctuate against the Egyptian pound. 
2. Motivate the public with a small premium. 
Once the currency board currency is introduced, what will motivate the 
Egyptian public to use it? A premiumcould be offered for a limited time 
when a member of the public exchanges the anchor currency for the 
currency board’s issued currency. The board’s interest earnings would 
enable it to recoup the cost of the premium. The premium would only be 
available on conditions that would inhibit attempts to create opportunities 
for unlimited arbitrage. 
3. End the premium. 
The premium offering must eventually cease. Thereafter, the currency 
board and the public are free to engage in any transactions between the two 
currencies of interest. 
 
7.3. Potential disadvantages of a currency board 
There are some potential disadvantages associated with a poorly 
executed currency board. Let us consider the most prominent issues with 
respect to three potential anchor currencies: the U.S. dollar, the euro, and 
the British pound.  
High dependence on the anchor currency. Fixing the Egyptian pound to 
ananchor currency means Egypt’s economy will be heavily tied to the state 
of the economy of the anchor currency. Since economies do not mimic each 
other perfectly in other aspects such as unemployment, inflation, etc., a 
change in interest rates in the anchor country may have detrimental 
impacts on the Egyptian economy. For instance, if the U.S. dollar is once 
again the anchor, and interest rates in the U.S. begin to rise steadily, then 
the effects will percolate into the Egyptian economy. A country that is 
attempting to accelerate the rate of economic growth would not want to 
experience a rise in interest rates. Moreover, stability is almost always a 
desired characteristic in economic policy. Therefore, relatively steady 
interest rates in the reserve country areimportant. 
Figure 17 indicates that prior to the Great Recession of 2008-09, the 
United Kingdom had the highest average nominal interest rate of the three 
potential anchor currencies. Once the Great Recession hit, one can observe 
the rapid drop in interest rates as central banks attempted to cushion the 
shocks. Note the historically low interest rates in the past half-decade or so. 
Only recently have they begun to rise, with the Federal Reserve taking the 
lead. 
In the past decade or so, the United States, euro area, and United 
Kingdom have experienced reduced inflation volatility compared to the 
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mid-to-late 20th century. Inflation stability is definitely an advantageous 
characteristic for an economy to have as it allows for predictability, and it is 
the latter that, amongst other things, entices foreign investors. It is also 
interesting to note that inflation rates in these economies mimic each other 
in terms of their trends. This makes sense in the current highly 
interdependent world. From the perspective of inflation stability, all of the 
above currencies are suitable for use in a currency board as anchor 
currencies. 
 
 
Figure 17. Interest rates in the euro area, USA, and UK. The UK rate is the Bank of 
England Official Rate, the US rate represents the Federal Funds Rate (mid index), and the 
euro area rate is the ECB refinancing rate (Bloomberg, 2017a). 
 
 
Figure 18. Inflation rates in the past half-century in the USA, euro area, UK. Inflation for 
the EU28 is shown from 1998 onwards 
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Poor choice of fixed exchange rate. As mentioned previously, deciding on 
the exchange rate between the Egyptian pound and the anchor currency is 
vital, since its implications can be significant. In order to decide on the most 
appropriate exchange rate, it seems most logical to observe the exchange 
rate under freely floating conditions. This would be the ideal exchange rate 
to choose, one thatis determined by the demand and supply forces of the 
market. In the case of Egypt, after the pound had experienced an extended 
period pegged to the US dollar, it was floated in November 2016. This 
resulted in its immediate depreciation against foreign currencies. To some 
extent, there is less work to do now, since it is possible to observe the trend 
of this floating rate, and thus determine an appropriate fixed rate. We 
suggest that a 120-day average of the floating exchange rate would be an 
appropriate basis for computing the value for fixing the Egyptian pound to 
an anchor currency.  
 
 
Figure 19. The value of the Egyptian pound relative to the British pound (blue), the US 
dollar (orange), and the euro (green), during the phase of the IMF loan. The 120-day 
average of the exchange rates are 18.01 EGP/GBP, 14.37 EGP/USD, and 15.50 EGP/EUR 
(Bloomberg, 2017b). 
 
Figure 19 shows the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound relative to the 
three currencies around the time of the IMF loan. The average values of the 
exchange rates are mentioned above as being 18.01 EGP/GBP, 14.37 
EGP/USD, and 15.50 EGP/EUR. Once one of these currencies is chosen as 
the anchor currency, the respective exchange rates is recommended to be 
used. Figure 20 below illustrates the most recent 120-day average of the 
floating exchange rates. If a currency board were to be initiated tomorrow, 
the following 120-day average exchange rate would need to be used.  
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Figure 20. The value of the Egyptian pound against the British pound (blue), the US dollar 
(orange), and the euro (green). The 120-day average of the exchange rates are 24.3 
EGP/GBP, 17.7 EGP/USD,and 21.50 EGP/EUR (Bloomberg, 2017b). 
 
8. Conclusion  
Soon after its initiation in 1898, the National Bank of Egypt was heavily 
involved in financing the Egyptian government. This is exemplified by the 
large proportion of its assets allocated to government securities, which 
reached a maximum of 75 percent in 1947. A lack of independence of the 
NBE is evidenced in the Jacome Central Bank Independence (CBI) Index 
which resulted in a value of 7 on a scale of 0 (not independent) to 19 (highly 
independent). The first half of the twentieth century coincided with an 
average yearly growth rate of real GDPof 2.6 percent. We were unable to 
find data for real GDP per person. In the same period, inflation sometimes 
fluctuateddrastically, partly because the NBE was targeting the exchange 
rate and not inflation. The average annual increase in the consumer price 
index between 1898 and 1961 was 3.1 percent.  
In time, Egyptian policymakers considered the creation of a modern 
central bank to be necessary. Thus, the Central Bank of Egypt was formed 
in 1960 and, among many other things, took over the Issue Department of 
the NBE. Unlike the NBE, the CBE does not engage in retail deposit taking 
and lending. In terms of the relationship of the central bank with the 
government, the switch from the NBE to the CBE changed the situation 
little. Though net claims on the government initially shrank after the 
formation of the CBE, they began to burgeon, attaining a peak value of 78 
percent in 1989. Although the central bank independence index of this 
period was fairly high at 10, the sub-components tell a different story. The 
way that members of the governing board were appointedremained 
structured in such a way as to hamper independence, and there existed a 
lack of discipline with regard to credit to the government. Recall further 
that in the latter half of the twentieth century,the CBE’s net foreign assets 
decreased from a peak of 78 percent of total assets in 1953 to a low of 8 
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percent in 1989. During the same period, the average yearly growth of real 
GDP per capita was around 2.6 percent. Even though inflation has been 
somewhat less volatile under the CBE than under the NBE, it hasaveraged 
9.7 percent a year, a significant increase from what was experienced under 
the NBE (3.1 percent).  
As of the latest figures at this writing, the net credit of the CBE to the 
government lies at 65.3 percent of its total credit. High net credit to the 
government is a recurring theme in the history of the NBE and CBE. It has 
been facilitated in recent years by a reduction in the central bank 
independence score as compared to the previous period, down to a value of 
8.5, the lowest score since the late 1960s. While the Arab Spring of 2011 is 
partly to blame for the economic challenges Egypt is currently facing, there 
are deeper issues within the economy that could be contributing to growth 
that is lower than Egypt’s potential. This realization resulted in the 
Egyptian government undertaking an IMF program starting in late 2016. In 
an attempt to both incentivize foreign investorsand increase Egypt’s 
foreign reserves, the Egyptian pound was allowed to float freely, resulting 
in its immediate devaluation by around 58 percent. The devaluation led to 
a subsequent increase in inflation, which rose above 30 percent in mid-2017 
but as of February 2018 had fallen to a still concerning rate of 14.4 percent.   
Given the historical difficulties of maintaining political independence for 
monetary policy in Egypt, we have proposed an alternative or perhaps a 
parallel solution to the existing economic situation. A currency board, 
characterized by minimal government intervention and high 
independence, seems to be a reasonable idea for Egypt. When evaluating a 
traditional currency board with the CBI, it resulted in an independence 
score of 12.5, higher than any attained during the history of the NBE and 
CBE. Its primary feature of high independence will ensure that net claims 
on central government will observe a decline, thus reducing the 
government’s dependence on the CBE as a lender of last resort. 
Furthermore, the implementation of currency boards in the past, in various 
nations, has yielded significant benefits in terms of lowering inflation, and 
boosting economic growth in the long run. The CBE is aiming to increase 
its foreign reserves to $33 billion by the end of the financial year 2018/2019, 
which ends on June 30th, 2019.This growth would increase the viability of 
introducing a currency board. 
We presented two scenarios for introducing a currency board: 
converting the CBE, or the possibly easier route of introducing a currency 
board in parallel to the central bank. We presented an example of the 
necessary measures that would be necessary to establish a currency board, 
but if the Egyptians were to actually implement a currency board, it would 
be desirable to revisit some of the pointsdiscussed to make sure that they 
still apply.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Nominal and Real GDP in Egypt (1886 – 1945) 
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Appendix B. Jacome Central Bank Independence Index – Scoring Justification 
Criteria and reasoning behind the scoring of the NBE, 1898-1961: 
1. Central Bank Objective ~ 0 
a. The NBE was not given official central bank powers until the mid to late 1950’s. 
Before then, it had acted as a commercial bank, therefore price stability was not its 
sole objective, if an objective at all.  
2. Appointment and Terms of Office of the Members of NBE ~ 0 
a. As mentioned in section I of the paper, there were foreign nationals on the board of 
the NBE who were not elected. Even though appointments had to be ratified by the 
government, there was no 2-step vetting process that occurred.  
3. Structure of Central Bank Board ~ 0 
a. The NBE had consisted of a wide array of people from different backgrounds, 
including entrepreneurs, and government officials from both Egypt and the UK. 
The high involvement of private and public sector officials justifies a score of 0.  
4. Removal of Board Members ~ 0.5 
a. Article 21 in the statue of the NBE states that the governor can be nominated for 5 
years. This can be categorized as ‘legal grounds’ as mentioned in the criteria for the 
score of 0.5. Judicial courts were not involved in this decision-making process. 
5. NBE credit to government ~ 0.5 
a. Article 15 of Law No. 163 exemplifies the limit the bank had in issuing loans to the 
government to cover seasonal debt. The fact that there was a limit, officially, 
implies a score of 0.5.  
6. Lender of Last Resort ~ 0.5 
a. Emergency loans were legally regulated and had a capital limit. This was seen to be 
the case as shown in point 5 above.  
7. Independence in monetary policy ~ 0.5 
8. Financial Independence ~ 1 
a. The government was highly involved in ensuring NBE integrity. 
9. Accountability ~ 1 
a. The governor of the NBE had to report to the government in a timely basis.  
10. Transparency and disclosure of financial statement ~ 1 
a. Publishes financial statements periodically and has them certified by external 
auditor. Their more recent annual reports can now be accessed online, whereas the 
older versions can be found in print, with some being digitized while working on 
this paper.  
 
Criteria and reasoning behind the scoring of the CBE FifthPeriod, 2005-2017 
11. Central Bank Objective ~ 0.5 
a. The CBE has had conflicting objectives in the past two decades. Many have shown, 
as explained in this report, that both maintaining a fixed exchange rate and 
controlling price levels is bound to be problematic. Ever since the IMF loan 
agreement in November 2016, the CBE has now oriented itself to targeting one goal: 
price stability. Given the recent introduction of a single objective, the score given 
seems satisfactory. If this remains consistent for the years to come, then the 
weighting is bound to increase.  
12. Appointment and Terms of Office of the Members of CBE ~ 0 
a. The CBE governor was recently directly appointed by the president of Egypt, 
Abdel Fatah El Sisi. Since this was a direct appointment that did not have any other 
processes, the value remains at 0. 
13. Structure of Central Bank Board ~ 0.5 
a. Although the minister of finance himself is not on the board of the CBE, there are 
some members from the private industry.  
14. Removal of Board Members ~ 0.5 
a. The presidential decree No.428/2015 allowed for reshuffling of the board because of 
its upcoming expiration (Mounir, 2015). This is deemed legal, allowing for a score 
of 0.5 according to the criteria. 
15. CBE credit to government ~ 0 
a. The CBE, over the years, especially both during the great recession and soon after 
the 2011 revolution, expanded its credit to the government.  
16. Lender of Last Resort ~ 0.5 
a. Are emergency loans legally regulated and have a capital limit. This was seen to be 
the case as shown in point 5 above.  
17. Independence in monetary policy ~ 0.5 
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18. Financial Independence ~ 1 
a. The government is highly involved in ensuring CBE integrity. 
19. Accountability ~ 1 
a. The governor of the CBE has been reporting to the government in a timely basis. 
This has also been the case with the recently appointed CBE governor, Tarek Amer.  
20. Transparency and disclosure of financial statement ~ 1 
a. Publishes financial statements periodically and has them certified by external 
auditor. Their annual reports can now be accessed online, further adding to their 
transparency. 
 
Criteria and the reasoning behind the scoring of an orthodox Currency Board (CB): 
1. Central Bank Objective ~ 0 
a. A CB does not have price stability as its objective for it cannot create or mitigate 
inflation.  
2. Appointment and Terms of Office of the Members of NBE ~ 0.5 
a. According to the currency board constitution, “The first two directors appointed by 
the government of Country X shall serve terms of one and four years. The first 
three directors appointed by the International Monetary Fund shall serve terms of 
two, three, and five years. Subsequent directors shall serve terms of five years. 
Directors may be reappointed once. Should a director resign or die, the appropriate 
organization as specified in paragraph 3(a) shall choose a successor to complete the 
remainder of the term“ (Hanke& Schuler, 2015).  
3. Structure of Central Bank Board ~ 0.5 
a. Two of the initial directors of the CB are appointed by the government. Whether 
these are government officials or not depends on the decision made. The 
assumption made is that they are government officials, thus generating a score of 
0.5.  
4. Removal of Board Members ~ 0.5 
a. Paragraph 4 of the CB constitution states that the board of directors have the right 
to hire and fire the CB staff. There is definitely no 2-step process involved here, and 
once again whether this done is done under legal grounds or not would affect the 
scoring. It is assumed that the removal is done under legal pretexts.  
5. NBE credit to government ~ 1 
a. CB cannot finance the domestic government if it begins to face economic debt. It is 
prohibited from doing so.  
6. Lender of Last Resort ~ 1 
a. A CB is not a lender of last resort. Financial institutions within the economy facing 
bankruptcy will have to look for alternative measures.  
7. Independence in monetary policy ~ 1 
a. A CB has a constitution thatclearly states its objectives and thus allows for 
transparency. Moreover, it is “protected from political pressure” or at least it is 
supposed to be.  
8. Financial Independence ~ 0.5 
a. The government is minimally involved with the CB and thus is not responsible for 
ensuring its integrity.  
9. Accountability ~ 0 
a. Since the CB is not directly involved with the government, the directors do not 
necessarily meet with the government in a periodic manner.  
10. Transparency and disclosure of financial statement ~ 1 
a. Due to the simplicity of the activities occurring within a CB, opaque activity is quite 
rare to find. It is also meant to publish financial statements at a minimum of a 
quarterly rate. 
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Appendix C. Case Study of Currency Board Success: Bulgaria 
The potentially galvanizing effect of a currency board on an economy is exemplified by Bulgaria, 
whose currency boardstabilized prices and boosted productivity. The conditions the currency board 
system faced were far more challenging than those presently existing in Egypt. 
Until 1997 the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) operated as Bulgaria’s central bank, issuing the 
Bulgarian lev. The Bulgarian financial system experienced structural issues in 1996, causing closure of 
nearly one-third of the banks. Inflation skyrocketed to 2040.4 percent by the first quarter of 1997 due to 
poor domestic confidence in the lev and a surplus of loans to banks nearing bankruptcy.  
To combat hyperinflation, Bulgaria began implementation of a currency board in May 1997, setting 
the exchange rate at 1000 Bulgarian leva per German mark. To establish a currency board system, 
Bulgarian law was altered to both allow the International Monetary Fund to assist in the economy’s 
stabilization and create a fiscal reserve account that ensures Bulgaria’s government has the reserves to 
adhere to any budgetary issues. The Bulgarian National Bank continued in existence, but under 
different guiding rules. 
Table C1 shows key economic factors, such as percent change in real GDP and inflation rate, before 
and after the implementation of the currency board. During the first quarter of 1996, real GDP dropped 
by 10.9 percent and inflation hit 310.8 percent. At its worst, Bulgaria’s inflation hit over 2000 percent, 
and real GDP growth hit negative 69 percent.     
 
Table C1. Macroeconomic indicators before and after Bulgaria’s adoption of a currency board 
(percent); first quarter (Gulde, 1999). 
 
 
After the currency board took effect, inflation dropped to 1 percent by the beginning of 1998, and 
GDP growth returned to a healthy 3.5 percent.  Today the currency board remains, pegging the lev to 
the Euro - no longer the mark - “[tying] the level of levs in circulation to the level of foreign exchange 
reserves” (Novinite Insider, 2015). 
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Figure C1. Bulgaria’s annual inflation rate, 1996-2017 
 
 
 
 
Figure C2. Bulgaria’s annual real GDP growth rate, 1996-2017 
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Appendix D. Balance Sheets 
This appendix includes samples of balance sheets of the Central Bank of Egypt and the aggregate of 
all commercial banks in Egypt. Digitized balance sheets of the NBE and CBE covering the years 1900 to 
2016 can be found in the associated Excel file.  
 
 
Figure D1. Financial Position of the Central Bank of Egypt 
 
 
Figure D2. Aggregate balance sheet of commercial banks in Egypt 
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Figure D3. CBE Balance sheet assets and liabilities for the years 2008 to 2015 (Central Bank of 
Egypt, 2015). In the report, the total value of assets does not equal that of liabilities. The reasons for 
the differences are not made apparent in the CBE’s annual reports. The reported figure of assets and 
liabilities for each year is shown by the line “Assets = Liabilities Reported.” 
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